Indiana Law Journal
Volume 72

Issue 4

Article 7

Fall 1997

Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place Children in Adoptions
Troy D. Farmer
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Farmer, Troy D. (1997) "Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place Children in Adoptions," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 72 : Iss. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss4/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place
Children in Adoptions
TROY D. FARMER"

INTRODUCTION
Adoptions, especially those beset with problems, are in the news. Mia Farrow
accused Woody Allen of sexually abusing one or more of their adopted children.'
The DeBoers lost custody of their adopted daughter of two years, "Baby Jessica,"
after her biological parents sued to reclaim her.2 Dennis and Diane Nason
adopted seventy-six children, most of whom were physically, mentally, or
emotionally disabled. Described as "The Celebration Family," they appeared on
the television program "60 Minutes." But later, after one infant died of
malnutrition and two others died after suffering from shigella, a bacterial
infection causing dysentery, Dennis and Diane Nason were accused of child
abuse and fatal neglect.3
Cases like these have focused the nation's attention on the adoption process
and the protection of the rights of those children placed by adoption. Unlike
"Baby Jessica," a healthy newborn when adopted, the children most often lost in
the adoption process and, therefore, the most in need of protection, are those
children defined as "hard to place." 4 Hard to place children are those who are
older (no longer infants) or who have physical handicaps or severe
psychological, mental, emotional, or behavioral problems. In addition, the hard
to place classification includes sibling groups, recognized as such by the

* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S. magna
cum laude, 1984, Ball State University. I would like to thank Professor Aviva Orenstein for her
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Note. Many thanks also go to my family for their love
and support and to the many friends who provided encouragement throughout this three year
odyssey known as "law school." This Note is dedicated to my friends Paul and Dawn Thomas
and their sons, Michael and John Joseph. Paul and Dawn's decision to add to their family led
not only to the adoption of John Joseph, but also to my research in the area of adoption law and
eventually to this Note's topic.
1. Judges: Woody Has No Appeal, NEWSDAY, May 13, 1994, at A3 1.
2. For an account of Jessica DeBoer's story, see Nancy Gibbs et al., In Whose Best
Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 44.
3. Jeanie Senior, Long and Complex TrialAheadfor Nasons, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
June 15, 1994, at D2, availablein 1994 WL 4519295. The charges filed against them included
"failing to provide adequate physical and medical care for fifteen children in their care,...
withholding food from two daughters, shocking some children with an electric cattle prod and
kicking one of their sons." Id Additionally, Diane Nason was accused of stabbing a son and
striking a daughter with a bottle. Id. Surprisingly, while these charges remained pending, the
Nasons won custody of their three-year-old grandson in a separate suit. Nasons, FacingTrial
on Abuse Charges, Win Custody of Grandson, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 16, 1994, at C2,
availablein 1994 WL 4576403.
4. Children who are hard to place are also called "children with special needs." The terms
are used interchangeably throughout this Note.

1166

INDIA NA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1165

Abandoned Infants Assistance Act of 1988.' Of all the children available for
adoption, an estimated sixty percent are hard to place.6 Hard to place children7
comprise the vast majority of children handled by public adoption agencies,
which now have the primary responsibility for their placement.8
The number of hard to place children residing in foster or group homes is ever
increasing as a result of the combination of several factors. First, the
deinstitutional movement has made many special needs children available for
adoption. This movement has sought to close orphanages and similar institutions
on the theory that they do not promote normal, healthy child development. The
movement promotes the least restrictive environment possible for all children,
regardless of their physical, emotional, or psychological problems.' Second, there
is an increasing number of unwanted babies born addicted to narcotics or other
substances."0 Finally, there is a greater willingness today to remove abused and
neglected children from their biological families."
Due to the shortage of healthy infants available for adoption, 2 prospective
parents who cannot afford to try to conceive through newer, expensive medical
procedures and do not want to face a long waiting period before adopting must
consider a hard to place child. Although some caseworkers celebrate this
increased chance for adoption, they often overlook two potentially devastating
problems. First, hard to place children face an increased risk of child abuse at the
hands of their adopted or foster parents. '" Second, they are subject to extreme
emotional and psychological trauma due to the potential loss of sibling
associations.1'
Christina and Catherine Crossman's story illustrates these problems. After
being physically and emotionally abused by their natural father, Christina,
Catherine, and their two older brothers became wards of the court and were
placed in separate foster homes. Following the termination of their natural
parents' rights, the court approved the adoption of Christina and Catherine by
Owen and Frances Crossman in April, 1981. Although Christina and Catherine

5. 42 U.S.C. § 673(c)(2)(A) (1994). States use a similar definition when determining
recipients of state assistance in the adoption process. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-3-1 (b)
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1996).
6. Susan L. Brooks, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of
PermanencyPlanningforChildren with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1132 (1991).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1138. Since the majority of hard to place children are placed through public
agencies, this Note limits its discussion to those adoption intermediaries. The reader should be
aware, however, that other intermediaries, for example, private agencies or attorneys, do
occasionally handle the adoptions of hard to place children.
9. Id. at 1137-38.
10. Id. at 1137.
11. Id.
12. This shortage is attributable to the increased availability of contraceptives and abortion,
an increased willingness on the part of single parents to keep their children, as well as a
generally declining birth rate. For analyses of the causes of the shortage, see id. at 1137 &
nn.49-52.
13. See infra part III.A.
14. See infra part III.B.
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remained separated from their brothers, they were lucky to be adopted together.
However, the adoption was an inappropriate placement. In April, 1985, Christina
and Catherine, who were then only eleven and twelve years old, reported to the
Phoenix police that Owen Crossman began fondling them shortly after their
placement and had subjected them to oral, anal, and vaginal intercourse
approximately three times per week since April, 1983. Christina and Catherine
again became wards of the court, and the Crossmans pled guilty to criminal
charges for sexual abuse. Christina and Catherine sued the State of Arizona,
alleging that the pre-adoption investigation of the Crossmans was negligently
performed. Had a reasonable investigation occurred, authorities would have
discovered that Owen Crossman had sexually abused an adult stepdaughter
during her teenage years and had himself been a victim of sexual abuse as a
child. 5
Cases like this, which are not rare, make obvious the need for increased
protection of the rights of hard to place children. This Note proposes that states
expand the relatively new tort of wrongful adoption to provide this protection.
Part I of this Note discusses the general trend in adoption policies away from a
shroud of confidentiality and closed doors. Part II then discusses the evolution
of the wrongful adoption tort and cases litigated thus far under this label. Part III
discusses why hard to place children are more likely to be victims of child abuse
and why the courts and other government officials must protect their sibling
association rights. Part IV then discusses methods to provide this protection. This
Part will include a discussion of current methods used, as well as why the
shortcomings of those methods support the expansion of the wrongful adoption
tort to provide necessary protection.
I. ADOPTION POLICY: A TREND TOWARD OPENNESS
Adoption is the statutory procedure establishing the parent-child relationship
of persons who are not so related by blood. 6 The adoptee's ties with his
biological parents are terminated, and the child becomes a child of the adoptive
parents for legal and familial purposes. The goal of adoption is to "provide every
child with a 'family-like living situation' that is permanent and safe."'7 The focus
of modem adoption statutes is on the adoptee 8 and the best interest of the child
remains the legal standard in adoption proceedings.' 9
Complete secrecy and confidentiality originally shrouded the adoption process.
Prior to the 1970s, agencies treated adopted children as if they never had a birth
family. Social workers tried to eliminate all traces of the birth family, and treated
the adopted child as "reborn." As a result, many agencies continue to seal records

15. Adams v. State, 916 P.2d 1156 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
16. For an example of state adoption statutes, sue IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-1 to -12
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1996).
17. RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION 108 (1988).

18. Pat McDonald-Nunemaker, Comment, Wrongful Adoption, The Development of a
Better Remedy in Tort, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 391, 392 (1994).

19. Brooks, supranote 6, at 1136.
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and to discourage communications between the birth family and the adoptive
family. 20
However, this presumption favoring confidentiality and secrecy has waned
over the last two decades. Research has shown that full disclosure of nonidentifying history offers psychological and practical benefits to the child and the
adoptive family.2 More important, disclosure of health information identifies
children who may have special needs, and who need an environment prepared to
accommodate them.
Adoption experts now call for the disclosure of non-identifying information to
the adoptive parents. Disclosure of the adoptee's health information, including
genetic history, is necessary to take advantage of new medical advances and
technology. 22 Nondisclosure of health information often impairs medical and
psychological diagnosis and treatment of adopted children, which prohibits
prevention of future disorders.'3
Without this diagnosis and treatment, adoptees are often placed with parents
who are totally unprepared and unable to deal with the challenges of a child with
special needs. Often these adoptive parents are aware of their financial and
emotional limitations in dealing with a child's special needs. These parents
specifically reveal to adoption caseworkers that they would be unable to adopt
such a child. Having adopted without knowledge of the child's special needs and
finding themselves unable to cope when the child's disorder later manifests, the
adoptive parents may seek an annulment of the adoption. Annulments are highly
disfavored due to the trauma caused to both2the
adoptive parents and the adoptee,
4
and are seldom in the child's best interest.
Attempting to reduce the number of annulments and recognizing the increasing
importance of the need for the adoptive child's health history, state legislatures
began enacting adoption statutes that allow greater disclosure of background
information. 25 Forty-six states have now enacted disclosure statutes. A majority
of these states require mandatory disclosure, while others provide for disclosure
at the adoptive parents' request or at the adoption agency's discretion. 26 The
purpose of these statutes is to prevent adoptions that are likely to end in
annulment by providing as complete a physical and psychological history as
possible.
Notwithstanding these statutes, the reality is that often this information is not
revealed. A recent survey showed that approximately one-third of the families
who had adopted children with physical and emotional traumas because of child
abuse were not informed of the prior abuse before the adoption. In more than

20. Note, When Love Is Not Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105

HARv. L. REv. 1761, 1763 (1992) [hereinafter When Love Is Not Enough].
21. See infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
22. McDonald-Nunemaker, supra note 18, at 395.
23. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth andNothing But the Truth: The

Limits of Liabilityfor Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851, 863 (1992).
24. McDonald-Nunemaker, supra note 18, at 393-94.
25. Blair, supra note 23, at 866.
26. For a listing of the disclosure statutes by state, see McDonald-Nunemaker, supra note
18, at 395-96 & n.29.
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one-half of adoptions involving children who were victims of past sexual abuse,
agencies did not inform the families of that fact before the adoptions were
finalized.'
The continuing practice of nondisclosure arises from several causes. Many
agencies cling to the belief that adoptive parents and adoptees are better off not
knowing any background information. Many caseworkers feel that negative
information hampers placement by stigmatizing the adoptee in the eyes of
prospective parents. Also, there is a fear that the information will harm the
child's self-image or cause anxiety about potentially developing an illness or
disorder. Others feel that disclosing background information facilitates tracing
of the birth parents and risks invasion of the birth family's privacy.2"
However, disclosure actually eliminates many of these concerns. Disclosure
of non-identifying health information facilitates diagnosis, prevention, and early
treatment of physical and psychological disorders for which a child might be
predisposed. Appropriate counseling and support services can prepare an
adoptive family to accept and cope with any physical or mental limitations the
adopted child might have.29
In addition, appropriate counseling and support services help with any
stigmatization an adopted child might feel. Adopted children often develop
identity conflicts from the lack of knowledge about the medical, social, and
ethnic backgrounds of themselves and their birth parents.3" Knowledge of their
genetic background can aid adoptees when making future decisions about
childbearing.3 Also, if all disclosed information is non-identifying, "the concern
that health information might facilitate tracing has not been viewed as
significant, particularly in comparison to the compelling arguments favoring
disclosure. 32
In addition to the reluctance of adoption agencies to disclose, the disclosure
statutes themselves are defective.33 A major concern is that most statutes do not
specify a standard of care for agencies to meet when making disclosures. As a
result, agencies reveal facts only "if available" or "where practicable." 4 A more
important concern is that the statutes do not impose a penalty on agencies that do
not disclose the information the statutes demand when this information exists.35
Prospective parents are completely dependent on the adoption agency as the
source of information. As such, they are vulnerable to fraud through

27. When Love Is Not Enough, supra note 20, at 1764.
28. Blair, supra note 23, at 861-62.
29. Id. at 863-64.
30. Id. at 864-65.
31. See Rita Beck Black, Genetics andAdoption:A Challengefor Social Work, in SOCIAL
WORK IN A TuRBuLENT WORLD 193 (Miriam Dinerman ed., 1981) (Seventh National Ass'n of
Social Workers Symposium).
32. Blair, supranote 23, at 865.
33. When Love Is Not Enough, supranote 20, at 1765 & n.29.
34. Id. at 1765.
35. Id.

1170

INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1165

misinformation or the omission of facts and other misrepresentations? 6 Often,
this fraud does not become apparent for several years. For example, symptoms
of a genetic disease for which the adoptee is predisposed may not appear until a
child is older. To provide prospective parents the full information available in
order to make their adoption decisions and to provide relief for unexpected
lifetime expenses assumed without knowledge of a child's potential problems,
courts are now allowing a new cause of action called "wrongful adoption."
II. THE TORT OF WRONGFUL ADOPTION

"Wrongful adoption is a tort action, based in fraud or negligence, which allows
adoptive parents to recover for intentional or negligent misrepresentations made
by an adoption agency... regarding their adopted child's [physical or mental]
health history or genetic background."37 The cause of action accrues when the
parents discover, or should have discovered, the illness or disorder and its causal
relation to the agency's conduct, or when the parents actually discover the
misrepresentation or fraud.38 In a typical scenario, the cause of action accrues
when adoptive parents learn of a misrepresentation upon manifestation of a
child's disorder, or when they obtain the pre-adoption records.39
In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court first recognized this new tort in Burr v.
Boardof County Commissioners.4 The court extended the common law tort of
fraud to material misrepresentations regarding an adopted child's background
made in the adoption context, holding that "the deliberate act of misinforming
this couple [the adoptive parents] ... deprived them of their right to make a
sound parenting decision and.., led to the compensable injuries."'" The court,
however, limited the scope of the tort to agencies guilty of intentional,
affirmative misrepresentation.4 2
Two years later, a California Court of Appeals extended the tort of wrongful
adoption in Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Department of Adoption. 43 The
court granted relief to adoptive parents for concealment of the fact that the
agency's doctor refused to make a definite statement on the condition of their
adopted child. The court established a standard of "good faith full disclosure of
material facts concerning existing or past conditions of the child's health."44 The
court limited the cause of action to intentional concealment and

36. Shannon M. Connelly, Note, The Needfor DisclosureLaws: A Survey of the WrongfulAdoption Cause ofAction and Statutory Remediesfor Adoption Fraud,10 REv. LITIG. 793,
795 (1991).

37. McDonald-Nunemaker, supranote 18, at 391. For an exhaustive analysis of the tort of
wrongful adoption, including its history, bases for recovery, limits of liability, measures for

damages, and policy considerations both for and against recovery, see Blair, supra note 23.
38. McDonald-Nunemaker, supra note 18, at 391.
39. Connelly, supranote 36, at 797.
40. 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
41. Id. at 1109.
42. Id.

43. 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App. 1988).
44. Id. at 513.
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misrepresentation by holding that agencies would not be liable for mere
negligence in providing information about a child.4"
However, in 1989, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Meracle v. Children's
Service Society,46 recognized a claim of negligent misrepresentation by an
agency. In Meracle, the court held that if an agency voluntarily provided
information, it must use reasonable care in doing so.47
Since 1989, several other states have allowed the tort of wrongful adoption,
grounded in intentional concealment or intentional or negligent
misrepresentation. 4" However, all states have stopped short of imposing a duty
of reasonable investigation of an adoptee's past, although suits alleging this duty
have been brought.4 9 The courts have hesitated to place the additional burden on
understaffed agencies to prevent making the agency a guarantor of good health."
Also, both parents and the adopted children themselves have recovered damages,
but liability has been limited to failure to reveal the child's background
information. To date, courts have not decided cases under the label of wrongful
adoption that relate to problems outside the nondisclosure of an adoptee's
background or history.
However, other causes of action are possible. Thus far, parents and adopted
children have recovered based on the fiduciary nature of the relationship that
arises between the agency and the parents, as well as the agency and the child.
The fiduciary relationship between the parents and the agency is a confidential
one based on the trust that arises between the prospective parents and the
adoption caseworker.5 ' The relationship between the agency and the child is one
of guardian and ward, long recognized as a fiduciary relationship. 2 Because the
agency owes the children in its custody a higher duty of care to be performed in
the utmost good faith, courts can remedy violations of that duty by granting
recovery to hard to place children harmed as a result of an inappropriate
placement. Part IV discusses the expansion of the wrongful adoption tort, based
on the agency's fiduciary duty toward hard to place children, to protect their
special interests. These special interests, discussed in more detail below, include
a greater risk of injuries from child abuse and the loss of sibling association
rights.

45. Id.
46.437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989). The Meracles brought suit against the Children's Service
Society of Wisconsin, an adoption agency, after their adopted daughter developed Huntington's
Disease, a fatal genetic disorder. The agency had informed the Meracles that their daughter was
not at risk for the disease.
47. Id. at 537.
48. Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, and Pennsylvania have
all recognized a form of the wrongful adoption tort. See McDonald-Nunemaker, supranote 18,
at 399-412. The Massachusetts Supreme Court recently recognized the tort for negligent or
intentional misrepresentations in Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995).
49. Blair, supranote 23, at 857 & n.15.
50. Connelly, supranote 36, at 798.
51. Id. at 799.
52. Michele Schiffer, Note, Fraudin the Adoption Setting, 29 ARIz. L. REV. 707, 712
(1987). See generallyAUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 2-

16A (4th ed. 1987).
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III. THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF HARD TO PLACE CHILDREN

A. High Risk for Child Abuse
Adoption agencies must prepare parents considering a hard to place child to
cope with the special needs of these children. Without forewarning and
preparation, serious emotional trauma for both the parents and the child is likely.
This trauma is only exacerbated if the parents find they cannot cope and feel their
only option is an annulment. 3 For the child's emotional health, as well as the
prospective parents, proper preparation is necessary before a child is placed in
a home.
Without screening and proper preparation of the parents, the risk of child abuse
is great in the adoption of a hard to place child. Many hard to place children fall
into the category of children who are at a "high risk" for abuse. Congenitally
malformed, mentally retarded, and difficult children are especially prone to
abuse.54 Difficult children are defined as "irritable youngster[s], the constantly
crying baby, the hyperactive child,"' in addition to those, with emotional
problems. However, all adopted children are more prone to emotional
disturbances and personality disorders, even those who are not suffering from
psychological trauma or those who were adopted at an early age." Therefore, all
adoptees need safeguarding, but especially those who are hard to place.
B. Loss ofSibling Association Rights
State governments regularly make decisions that affect children and their
family status. State courts often determine placement of children in divorces,
custody disputes, and adoption approvals. State agencies often determine
placement in adoption and foster care. State legislatures regulate the adoption
process. As a result of these adoption processes, adoption caseworkers separate
approximately 35,000 brothers and sisters into different foster or adoptive homes
each year.5 Siblings who are initially separated in different placements for what
is intended to be a short time have dramatically decreased chances of being
placed together later." Siblings who are separated suffer trauma not only from
being separated from their natural parents, but also from anxiety over the loss of
association with their brothers and sisters.

53. It is not only children with severe genetic or psychological disorders who are at risk.
It is estimated that one in every 10 adoptions of children over the age of three results in
termination. See McDonald-Nunemaker, supranote 18, at 392.
54. BLAIR JUSTICE & RITA JUSTICE, THE ABUSING FAMILY 248 (1976).

55. Id. at 252.
56. MARY KATHLEEN BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 167 (1976).

57. William Wesley Patton & Dr. Sara Latz, Severing Hanselfrom Gretel: An Analysis of
Siblings 'Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 745, 745 (1994).
58. Id. at 787.
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There is some state recognition of the importance of maintaining sibling
association. Courts have long recognized the importance of not separating
siblings in custody disputes. Judges have noted that siblings "need each other's
strengths and association in their everyday and often common experiences" and
that the emotional and biological bonds are quite strong.59 In addition, courts
avoid the separation of siblings to sustain sibling bonds, because the parents will
probably die before the children and they will only have each other as they
become adults.6"
A child's best interests should require a showing of compelling reasons before
siblings are separated. As such, courts have begun to emphasize the sibling
relationship and to place it above the wishes of adoptive parents. Courts have
held that "a family court can order maintenance contacts between siblings when
necessary to protect the child's best interests, even if such contacts are opposed
by the adoptive parents.'
State legislatures are also defining sibling rights. Several states have enacted
statutory provisions to facilitate visitations between siblings, if they must be
separated. Most state statutes direct the courts to use the best interests standard
when deciding whether to grant sibling visitation rights.62
Despite these protections, judges do not show the reluctance to separate
siblings in foster care or adoption placements that they show in custody decisions
accompanying divorces. There are several causes for this disparity. First, in
custody disputes accompanying divorces, the choice is usually between granting
one parent custody of the group or separating siblings by placing one or more of
them, but not all, with one parent. One can assume judges are reluctant to
separate the siblings when they can easily grant custody of all the siblings to one
parent, and grant the other parent joint custody or visitation rights.
Second, finding adoptive parents to take a group of siblings is always difficult,
if not impossible. 63 In addition, the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act of 198864

59. Barbara Jones, Note, Do Siblings Possess ConstitutionalRights, 78 CORNELL L. REv.
1187, 1190 (1993).
60. Id
61. Id. at 1192. See, for example, New York ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard,429 N.E.2d 1049
(N.Y. 1981), in which the New York Court of Appeals ordered maintenance contacts between
siblings over the wishes of the adoptive parents. The court felt the sibling contact was in the
child's best interest. Jones, supra note 59, at 1192 n.24.
62. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-102 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3102 (Michie
1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.330 (Michie
1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1993). The New York statute states:
Mhe court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any other person or party
having the care, custody, and control of such child, to be given in such manner
as the court shall prescribe, may make such directions as the best interest of the
child may require, for visitation rights for such brother or sister in respect to such
child.
63. William Wesley Patton, The World Where ParallelLines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incriminationin ConcurrentCivil andCriminalChildAbuse Proceedings,24 GA.

L. REv. 473, 492 (1990).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679(a) (1994).
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provides that adoption is the preferred model of permanent and stable placement
for children. States operate under this presumption by separating siblings when
they are not adoptable as a group, but where one or more of the siblings can be
placed individually.6"
Patton and Latz argue that the presumption of adoption as the best placement
is harmful to displaced children. First, adoption is an unrealistic expectation
given the low percentage of adoptions in relation to the number of children in
need of placement. Second, states can lose federal funds for not implementing
the mandate to end indeterminate placements in foster homes or guardianships.
This presumption of adoption forces social workers to find adoptive homes based
upon the economic necessity of the state rather than the best interests of the child
or sibling group. This "forced adoption" results in lower self-esteem among hard
to place children. Also, prospective long-term guardians or foster parents are
viewed as second-class providers, when they may be the best providers for these
children under the circumstances. Finally, with the presumption of adoption as
the best placement, brothers and sisters are split apart without consideration
given to keeping them together in alternative care, such as a residential home.66
In essence, caseworkers consider the best interests of the adoptee standing alone,
without any consideration of the best interests of the sibling group.
The importance of the sibling bond has not escaped the study of psychologists,
sociologists, scientists, and philosophers. 67 Studies demonstrate that the sibling
bond may be as important in childhood development as the parental one.
Foremost among these studies is attachment research.
"Attachment research offers a rich empirical basis for evaluating the nature and
importance of bonding. Attachment describes an enduring emotional bond
manifest by efforts to be in close proximity, especially at times ofstress."'6 The
search for attachment relationships is a central goal of early childhood
development, and the success of finding such relationships has been proffered
as a foundation for characteristics such as self-esteem, capacity for intimacy,
basic trust in relationships, and adaptivity throughout adult life. 69 Without these
relationships, adverse developmental problems may occur. These problems
include "depressed educational attainments," and findings show persons who
were deprived of these relationships are "disproportionally represented among
the ranks of the unemployed, the mentally ill, drug abusers, and criminals."70
Though emphasis has historically been on the parent-child relationship,
attachment research now recognizes that "sibling
relationships are perhaps the
71
most important and the least recognized."

65. Patton & Latz, supra note 57, at 752-53.
66. Id. at 753.
67. For a discussion of different studies concerning the importance of sibling bonds, see
id. at 760-68.
68. Id. at 761 (second emphasis added).
69. Id. at 762.
70. WILLIAM FEIGELMAN & ARNOLD R. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN 29 (1983).
71. Patton & Latz, supra note 57, at 763-64.
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The importance of the sibling relationship becomes paramount when the stress
of severance from the biological parent is present. As one commentator has
noted, often children under this stress
form a sub-family with one child assuming the parental responsibility for
another. Consequently, the ties between siblings are often even stronger than
the ties of the children to their biological parents. These ties are strengthened
when the children are placed in a foster [or adoptive] family; they tend to
cling together to reduce some of the overwhelming strangeness .... Children
separated from brothers and sisters may never resolve their feelings of loss,
even if there are new brothers and sisters whom they grow to love.72
Among siblings separated from their natural families, more of them search for
their biological siblings than for their birth parents.73 One of the major reasons
children give for running away from foster homes is to see their natural
siblings.74 These facts demonstrate the strength of the sibling bond.
IV. PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR THE RIGHTS OF HARD TO

PLACE CHILDREN

Adoption caseworkers operate with severe budget constraints, have
overwhelming case loads, and often presume that adoption is always the ideal
solution for a child with special needs. In order to reduce their case loads,
caseworkers often attempt to stretch the preferences of prospective parents and
"whitewash" the adoptee's background.7' As a result, hundreds of inappropriate
placements occur each year, creating potentially dangerous situations for these
children.76 In addition, it has been estimated that forty-one percent of displaced
children nationwide are separated from their siblings in foster or adoptive
homes." This occurs even though adoption agencies owe these children a high
standard of care, as the guardian-ward relationship is characterized as a fiduciary
one.7' Therefore, the agency already has a duty to act in the utmost good faith in
protecting the welfare of these children.
Hard to place children need protection to prevent the traumas resulting from
inappropriate placements. Because state adoption agencies place the majority of
children with special needs, potential actions under § 1983"9 provide some
protection for these children. However, as this Note will show, this protection is
not sufficient. By recognizing that the fiduciary duty of adoption agencies
requires them to protect hard to place children from inappropriate placements and
allowing recovery to the children under the negligence component of the

72. Patton, supra note 63, at 491-92 (quoting CLAUDIA L. JEWETr, ADOPTING THE OLDER
CHILD 161-62 (1978)).

73. Patton & Latz, supranote 57, at 780.
74. Id.
75. "Whitewashing" occurs when caseworkers present the child's background information
in a positive light, regardless of any past or present difficulties that the child might have.
Brooks, supra note 6, at 1154 & n.185.
76. Id at 1154-55.
77. Patton & Latz, supranote 57, at 758. For sibling statistics by state, see id at 756, 802.
78. See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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wrongful adoption tort, courts will provide the added protection these children
need.
A. Insufficient ProtectionThrough § 1983 Actions
As stated previously, state adoption agencies handle the majority of placements
for children with special needs. 80 As such, § 1983, which grants a civil cause of
action to one deprived of a constitutional right by a person exercising authority
under color of state law, may provide recovery for damages resulting from
inappropriate placements. Section 1983 does not create rights, but provides
remedies for rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws."
In addition to the fact that rights must already be recognized under the
Constitution or federal law, other impediments limit the usefulness of § 1983
actions for hard to place children. Adoptees cannot sue state governmental
entities and state officials acting in their official capacity for damages under §
1983. Therefore, public adoption agencies that are subdivisions of a state
department will not be liable for damages.82 Employees of the state agency can
be sued in their individual capacity, but the employee must have acted personally
in depriving the right.83 Also, framing the cause of action as a negligent violation,
rather than intentional, may bar recovery. In Daniels v. Williams,84 the Supreme
Court held that ordinary negligence cannot form the basis for a § 1983 action. 5
These restrictions severely limit the use of § 1983. Other obstacles specific to
abuse cases and to the loss of sibling association rights show that § 1983
protection alone is not enough.
1. Child Abuse Cases Under § 1983
The seminal case concerning recovery for child abuse injuries under § 1983 is
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Departmentof Social Services.86 In this case,
state social workers investigated four separate reports of child abuse against
Joshua DeShaney by his father, Randy. Although caseworkers suspected
Joshua's injuries were the result of physical abuse and Randy did not abide by
recommendations he agreed to with the Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, caseworkers let Joshua remain in his father's custody. Randy
subsequently beat Joshua so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma and
is expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the mentally
retarded.87
Joshua and his mother sought damages from the Department of Social Services
under § 1983 for failing to protect Joshua. However, the Supreme Court held that

80. See supranotes 7-8 and accompanying text.
81. Blair, supra note 23, at 963.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 962.
84. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
85. Id. at 332-33.
86. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
87. Id. at 192-93.
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the social workers who had investigated the instances of abuse were not liable
for Joshua's injuries. This decision seems fatal to claims by hard to place
children attempting to recover from agency employees for placement in an
abusive home. Such claims are distinguishable, however, from the claim in
DeShaney.
In DeShaney, the Court held that a state's failure to protect an individual
against violence by a private actor is not a violation of the Due Process Clause,88
and that there is "no affirmative right to governmental aid." 9 However, in
contrast to Joshua DeShaney, the hard to place child is usually in state custody
before the state places him or her in an abusive home. In Youngberg v. Romeo,9"
the Court held that "the Constitution requires the responsible state officials to
take steps to prevent children in state institutions from deteriorating physically
or psychologically.""' Citing Youngberg, the Seventh Circuit has allowed
children to recover when placed in a foster home with a known abuser. 92
Therefore, hard to place children who were in the custody of a state agency
before placement have a viable argument. However, Judge Posner stated that, in
light of DeShaney, recovery after placement in the private home may be limited. 93
Therefore, additional protection beyond that provided by § 1983 is necessary.
2. Protection of Sibling Association Rights Under § 1983
Courts have allowed recovery for loss of sibling association rights under §
1983. Specifically, some federal courts have allowed recovery for siblings denied
visitation rights in foster placement,94 and for the loss of association due to
wrongful death. 95 However, other federal courts, and even judges in the same
district, have denied recovery in similar cases. 96 This disparity exists because §
1983 protects rights guaranteed by the Constitution or other federal laws and, to

88. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
90. 457 U.S. 307 (1992).
91. K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Youngberg).
92. Id at 853-54.
93. Id. at 852.
94. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that half-sister who lived with
half-brother and half-sister for several years had a liberty interest in preserving the integrity and
stability of the family under the Due Process Clause); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp.
1002 (N.D. Il1.1989) (holding that siblings' freedom of association rights included the right
to maintain and develop their relationship).
95. Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that
sister had constitutionally protected First Amendment interest in her relationship with her
brother, who died while incarcerated in a county jail).
96. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.
Supp. 1387 (N.D. II1.1989); Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207 (La. Ct. App. 1985). The
reasons given in these cases for not extending recovery to siblings is the lack of a clearly
established constitutional right and other considerations similar to those given by the state
courts in denying damages. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23. For a history of how
state and lower federal courts have thus far dealt with the issue of siblings' associational rights,
see Jones, supra note 59, at 1189-1209.
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date, no state supreme court, nor the United States Supreme Court, has
specifically addressed whether a person, as an individual member of a family
with independent rights, has a right to maintain sibling relationships.97 Concrete
recognition of these rights is necessary to fully protect hard to place children
under § 1983.
Commentators argue that principles firmly established by the United States
Supreme Court provide constitutional protection for sibling association rights.
These commentators contend that the substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment provide this protection.
Using the three guidelines established by the Supreme Court to define the
qualities of a family in Smith v. Organization ofFosterFamilies,98 commentators
contend protection of siblings is provided by the substantive Due Process Clause.
The first guideline is a biological relationship, which exists between full-blood
and half-blood siblings. The second guideline requires "emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association." 9' Siblings who are raised in
the same home share these types of emotional bonds. The third guideline requires
that the origin of the familial relationship be derived from outside the power of
the State. This guideline is met as siblings are family members by birth and not
by state decree. Because sibling relationships meet these three guidelines, the
commentators conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment
should provide
00
constitutional protection of sibling association rights.
Commentators further contend that the First Amendment protects sibling
relationships even if the biological relationship required under the Smith analysis
is not present. This would include the protection of the association rights of
adopted siblings and step-siblings.
This argument is based on the Supreme Court's holding in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees.' °' The Court stated that protection from unjustified state
interference is offered for "the formation and preservation of... highly personal
relationships."'o 2 In describing family relationships, the Court stated:
Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares
not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things, therefore,
they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusions
from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only
relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the

97. Jones, supra note 59, at 1188; Patton & Latz, supra note 57, at 768. For a thorough
analysis of arguments for recognition of sibling association as a fundamental right under the
United States Constitution, see Jones, supra note 59, at 1209-19; Patton & Latz, supra note 57,
at 768-800.
98. 431 U.S. 816, 843-47 (1977).
99. Id. at 844.
100. Jones, supra note 59, at 1208-09; see also Patton, supra note 63, at 492 & n.69.
101. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In this case, the Supreme Court discussed freedom of association
rights under the First Amendment in holding that the Minnesota Human Rights Act did not
violate the Jaycees' association rights by compelling them to accept women as members.
102. Id. at 618.
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considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as
an intrinsic element of personal liberty.'0 3
Commentators contend that sibling relationships, including those formed by
adoptive and step-siblings, clearly fit into this characterization and therefore
should have First Amendment protection.'04 The court in Aristotle P. agreed and
held that siblings' freedom of association rights included the right to maintain
and develop their relationship.0 5
If the United States Supreme Court, when again faced with the opportunity,
adopts either of these arguments, it would provide the powerful protection
necessary to protect sibling association rights under § 1983. Until the Court
extends this protection, however, additional protection is necessary to induce
adoption agencies to give the appropriate consideration to these rights of hard to
place children.
B. Expanding the Tort of Wrongful Adoption to Protect
Hardto Place Children
As stated in Part II, courts have thus far limited the causes of action under the
tort of wrongful adoption to those wrongs emanating from nondisclosure of an
adoptee's background or history. Because agencies have a fiduciary duty to
protect children in their care, courts can expand the negligence cause of action
under this tort to provide the additional protection that hard to place children
need.
1. Expanding the Tort to Provide Protection from Abuse
To protect hard to place children from abusive environments, courts should
expand the duty of adoption agencies to include a reasonable investigation into,
and evaluation of, the possibility that prospective parents might have abusive
tendencies. Among the factors courts consider in negligence cases when deciding
whether to impose a duty include the gravity, probability, and foreseeability of
harm, the policy of preventing future harm, and the burden on the actor.0 6 Here,
these factors support requiring the agency to make this determination before
placement. Injury to the child is foreseeable, preventable, potentially very grave,
and the additional burden on the agency is minimal.
This additional burden is minimal because the adoption statutes already require
the agency to conduct a pre-adoption investigation.'0 7 These laws require a check
with statewide central registries of child abuse reports for any reports made on
the prospective parents. The additional duty to be imposed would require the

103. Id. at 619-20.
104. Jones, supranote 59, at 1209.
105. Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. I1. 1989).
106. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 359 &
n.24 (5th ed. 1984).
107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.2805
(Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:14 (1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.13 (West 1995).
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further step of psychological evaluations of the parents. These evaluations would
be in the form of screenings to identify indicators showing potential for abusive
behavior.
These evaluative tests are possible "[b]ecause the profile of the abusing parent
is fairly well established."' 8 These predictive evaluations focus on "feelings of
isolation, reaction to criticism, feelings toward spouse, parental treatment,
expectations of children, attitudes toward punishment and feelings of
nervousness, distress, and potential loss of control."' 9 Assuming these
evaluations accurately predict the possibility of an abusive environment,
potential harm to hard to place children should be foreseeable.
If these tests indicate a high risk for abuse, agencies could then require that,
at a minimum, the prospective parents undergo counseling before an agency will
place a child in their home. In addition, agencies could require stringent and
comprehensive post-adoptive services to help these parents while undergoing the
life changes that occur when a child moves in. Post-adoptive services for the
child and the parents can make the difference between a successful and
unsuccessful placement of special needs children."' However, if the tests show
that the risk of abuse is too great, the agency would refuse the placement.
Various policy reasons support imposing this duty on adoption agencies."' The
first is a policy of matching parental resources and a child's needs. Parents
whose evaluations show a low risk for abusive behavior, and who are willing to
adopt a child with special needs, can be matched with such a child. This prevents
parents who practically can only care for a child without such needs from
inflicting further trauma on the hard to place child.
Another policy reason for imposing a duty on the agency is that the threat of
liability for subjecting children to abuse would have a deterrent effect. To escape
damage awards, agencies would put procedures in place to insure proper preadoptive investigations. This would help avoid the harmful consequences an
adoptee faces in an abusive home.
A policy of compensation also supports the parental evaluation. If the agencies
do not investigate the psychological profile of the prospective parents, the
agencies should compensate the child for injury and emotional trauma traceable
to the failure to investigate. This policy is equivalent to the policy of
compensating children whose backgrounds are not disclosed and later develop
problems preventable with early treatment. This is the compensation allowed thus
far in wrongful adoption cases.'2
Finally, imposing the duty to evaluate prospective parents fosters the
institution of adoption. As some commentators have noted, the public must have
confidence in the processes of adoption because:
[A]doption serves important societal interests. Through adoption, children
who might not otherwise have a permanent family or... appropriate care and

108. JUsTICE & JusTiCE,supra note 54, at 243.
109. Id.
110. Brooks, supra note 6, at 1152.
111. For a discussion of various policy considerations in wrongful adoption actions, see
Blair, supra note 23, at 877-96.
112. See supra part II.
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stability can have the opportunity to receive the care and nurturing they need
in a familial setting from parents who have made a long term commitment to
them. To the extent that children have the opportunity to develop a positive
self-identity in a supportive, stable environment, society is spared the social
problems that often accompany societal failure to meet the physical and
emotional needs of its youngest members. Birth parents who are not prepared
emotionally or financially to raise a child are provided an option that allows
them to plan for the care of their child and postpone parenting until they feel
ready for it.... Adoptive parents have the opportunity to experience the joys
of parenthood."'
The obvious objection to requiring this additional evaluation is the costs
involved in both administration and interpretation of the tests, as well as any
additional post-adoptive services that might be necessary. Post-adoptive services
4
are expensive and often receive low priority due to budget constraints."
To overcome this objection, agencies could require the prospective parents to
contribute to the costs by having them pay for the evaluations. Not only does this
allow the agency to conserve its funds, but it also provides a good indicator of
those prospective parents who really want to adopt, helping to eliminate those
who may only be seeking the financial assistance provided to parents who adopt
children with special needs." 5
The evaluation results will also provide information to the agency for use in
focusing where to best expend funds for post-adoptive services. Although postadoptive services are necessary in all adoptions of hard to place children, the
agency can direct its scarce funds toward placements where it is most needed.
Also, any initial increase in funds that the agency itself may expend in the
adoption process will eventually save money if more permanent placements are
successful. Agencies will save money on the additional necessary custodial care,

113. Blair, supranote 23, at 888.
114. Brooks, supra note 6, at 1153.
115. Under federal law, a state may qualify for federal subsidies for foster care and adoption
assistance if it provides financial assistance to adoptive parents of children with special needs.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-73 (1994). Most states provide this assistance. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-3-3-2 (Michie Supp. 1996). However, as stated in the Indiana statute, these payments are
made "to the extent that funds are available." Id § 31-3-3-2(b). Due to budget constraints, the
assistance, in all probability, will not be enough to cover additional expenses due to medical
or psychological problems of hard to place children or the additional costs of adopting a sibling
group. Therefore, adopting parents will need to have resources available to cover these costs.
The author does not necessarily advocate limiting adoptions to those who can afford to pay the
screening fees. However, in the case of special needs children, the willingness to pay these fees
provides evidence of the parents' ability and desire to expend their resources to provide for the
additional lifetime expenses these children might need.
The goal of the federal legislation is to provide permanent placement for children with
special needs. Denying adoptions because of the high risk of abuse or to prevent sibling
separation may result in the states' loss of this much needed assistance. Granting adopted
children these causes of action will encourage Congress to decrease the pressure on agencies
by increasing funding for post-adoptive services and the development of residential
alternatives, such as group homes, for special needs children. See Brooks, supra note 6, at
1153-55, 1159-63.
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which is very expensive, and subsequent placement costs if the adoptee is not
returned to the agency's care due to an inappropriate placement." 6
The duty to require tests that predict abuse would not require the agencies to
guarantee that adoptees will never be subject to abuse. It would only require that
the agency take reasonable steps to prevent abuse when indicators show it to be
a substantial risk. Such steps include providing alternative placement or requiring
counseling and post-adoptive services to minimize the risks. Imposing this duty
provides valuable protection to lessen the chance that children like Christina and
Catherine Crossman will suffer debilitating physical and psychological injuries.
2. Expanding the Tort to Protect Sibling Association
Rights
An expansion of the wrongful adoption tort to encompass procedures beyond
disclosing the adoptee's background will also help protect the sibling association
rights of hard to place children. Requiring the agency to consider these rights
when making placement decisions would lower the number of siblings who are
needlessly separated due to the presumption of adoption as the ideal solution.
Again, the factors courts consider when determining whether a duty exists" 7
support imposing this requirement.
The emotional trauma occurring due to the separation of siblings is foreseeable
and potentially very grave. This trauma is preventable by considering alternative
placements for the sibling group, such as a residential or group home. The
consideration of sibling association rights and alternative placements is not an
additional burden, as the agencies are already instructed by state statutes to
consider the best interests of the child. Therefore, they will incur no additional
costs. The agencies must simply consider the best interests of the sibling group
when deciding the best interests of an individual child within that group.
One policy reason for imposing this duty is to bolster the confidence of
displaced children and the public in the institution of adoption. Many displaced
children do not trust the adoption process because they fear that adoption will
separate them from a sibling. As noted previously, the reason most children who
run away from foster or adoptive homes give for their actions is to see their
siblings who have been placed elsewhere."'
The strongest policy consideration favoring the expansion of the wrongful
adoption tort to cover loss of sibling association is the deterrent effect it will
provide. It is in the case of sibling groups that the presumption of adoption as the
ideal solution is the most dangerous. Providing a deterrent to separating siblings
is critical so that caseworkers will recognize that the sibling bond is often
stronger than a parental bond and vital to the emotional health of many hard to
place children. If adoption means separation of siblings who have formed deep
attachments to one another, that placement may do more harm than good.
Because adoption assistance programs focus on private placement, this

116. Brooks, supra note 6, at 1161-62.
117. See supratext accompanying note 106.
118. See supratext accompanying note 74.
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presumption is strongly driven by economic considerations and requires a strong
force to counteract it. Expanding the tort to provide that force will require
caseworkers to consider the sibling bond and prevent the separation of siblings
when it is not in their best interests. It will also require caseworkers to consider
channelling the limited funds for post-adoptive services to facilitating sibling
visitations when the separation of siblings is an absolute necessity.
A policy of compensation also supports the imposition of this duty. Damages
in these cases would cover "emotional injuries due to loss of companionship,
society, and comfort," 9 that is, loss of sibling consortium. These emotional
injuries can be severe due to the strength of the sibling bond among displaced
children. However, even expanding the wrongful adoption tort to recognize a
cause of action for loss of sibling consortium may not be enough. Although some
states have allowed siblings to recover for loss of consortium in actions for the
wrongful death of a sibling, ° many have also denied recovery on this basis. 2'
Courts often reject consortium claims outside the spousal relationship because
of a fear that recovery would "cause an unreasonable expansion of tort liability,
a multiplicity of lawsuits, difficulty in assessing damages, and would constitute
an unwarranted failure to defer to the legislature.""u Courts have denied recovery
to children for loss of parental consortium for these same reasons. 23
' Obviously
these concerns make computing a damage award difficult. Despite this difficulty,
recognition of a cause of action for the loss of sibling association under this tort
is still necessary. Compensation for these injuries contributes to the deterrent
effect and recognition of this cause of action provides a step in the right direction
towards the realization of sibling association as a fundamental liberty right
protected by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

All children deserve the help necessary to enable them to become fully
functional, contributing members of society. Hard to place children need extra
protection. Like all adoptees suffering from the trauma of separation from birth
parents and resulting identity conflicts, they are at a disadvantage starting out.
They do not need the burden of further traumas resulting from the separation of
their siblings or the placement in an abusive home. In addition, an annulment
resulting from a disruptive adoption placement causes the child "tremendous

119. Matthew Brady, Back Up and Hit Him Again: Illinois' Problem with Parental
ConsortiumLost Because ofNonfatal Injury, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 548 (1994).
120. See, e.g., In re Estate of Young, 601 N.E.2d 699 (Ill.
1992); Crystal v. Hubbard, 324
N.W.2d 869 (Mich. 1982).
121. See, e.g., Williams v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App. 1993);
Long v. Dugan, 788 P.2d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
122. Brady, supra note 119, at 556.
123. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (holding that
denial of recovery on these grounds does not violate equal protection).
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instability, emotional upheaval, and a sense of rejection that can be permanently
damaging"' 24 and can diminish chances for later adoption.125
One adoption specialist noted that it makes no sense to place children with
parents who cannot handle their needs and nurture them. 126 To insure that the
number of these inappropriate placements is reduced, this Note argues that courts
should expand the tort of wrongful adoption by requiring adoption agencies to
evaluate prospective parents to determine their tendencies for abusive behavior.
The agencies will not guarantee that an adoptee will never be abused. However,
proper psychological testing of prospective parents and comprehensive postadoptive services will dramatically reduce the risk an adoptee might otherwise
face.
Many psychologists and sociologists have concluded that adopted children
should have "an inalienable right.., to avoid the anguish and damage that the
denial of [familial association] would inflict upon them."' 27 More recognition of
the special attachments children have with siblings is necessary to protect sibling
association rights. Agencies should consider alternatives for siblings other than
adoption, such as residential homes. Until the United States Supreme Court
provides the necessary recognition by extending constitutional protection to
sibling association rights, courts should expand the tort of wrongful adoption to
include recovery for sibling associations that are unnecessarily denied. The
agencies would not guarantee sibling association. It is possible that the child's
best interests might require a severance of ties to a sibling, such as when siblings
are separated when extremely young, or when they have never lived together and
formed sibling attachments. The duty would only require that agencies, whose
employees have specialized knowledge and training, use that expertise in
considering whether the best interests require that the siblings remain unified in
placement or in placements that facilitate visitation and contact. The agencies
must stop presuming that adoption is always the ideal placement and consider the
best interests of the sibling group when determining an individual child's best
interests. By expanding the tort of wrongful adoption to encompass these duties,
courts will help give hard to place children the chance they deserve.

124. Blair, supra note 23, at 882.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 864.
127. FEIGELMAN & SILVERMAN, supra note 70, at 29.

